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Abstract
With the goal of better understanding some of the psycho-
logical factors related to refugees’ desire to return home,
surveys were administered to 235 South Sudanese refugees
living in the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya. Respon-
dents were asked about how much they wanted to return
to Sudan, their emotional reactions about returning, their
views on the prospects for peace, their expectations regard-
ing how they would be received upon return, and their
concerns about specific challenges they might face. In addi-
tion, they completed an inventory measuring their per-
sonal beliefs about issues in five domains: vulnerability,
injustice, distrust, superiority, and helplessness in regard
to prospective returnees to Sudan. A large majority was
very eager to repatriate. Individual differences in attitudes
toward returning were significantly linked to the strength
of their beliefs in the five domains. Stronger beliefs about
vulnerability, injustice, distrust, and helplessness were as-
sociated with more negative perceptions of return, while a
stronger belief about returnee superiority was correlated
with a more favourable perspective on repatriation.
Résumé
Dans le but de mieux comprendre quelques-uns des fac-
teurs psychologiques liés au désir des réfugiés de retour-
ner chez eux, des enquêtes ont été conduites auprès de
235 réfugiés originaires du sud Soudan et vivant dans le
camp de réfugiés de Kakuma, au Kenya. On posa aux ré-
pondants des questions sur l’intensité de leur désir de re-
tourner au Soudan, leurs réactions émotionnelles par
rapport à toute la question du retour, leur point de vue
sur les perspectives pour la paix, leurs attentes quant à la
façon dont ils seraient reçus au retour, et leurs préoccupa-
tions quant aux défis spécifiques qui pourraient les con-
fronter. En plus, ils complétèrent aussi un inventaire de
personnalité permettant d’évaluer leurs croyances person-
nelles sur des questions relatives à cinq domaines : la vul-
nérabilité, l’injustice, la méfiance, la supériorité, et le
sentiment d’impuissance par rapport aux éventuels can-
didats au retour au Soudan. La grande majorité était très
désireuse de rentrer au pays. Les différences individuelles
dans les attitudes par rapport au retour étaient étroite-
ment liées à l’intensité de leur croyance dans les cinq do-
maines. Une croyance plus forte dans la vulnérabilité,
l’injustice, la méfiance, et le sentiment d’impuissance
était associée à des perceptions plutôt négatives sur le re-
tour, alors qu’une croyance plus forte quant à la supério-
rité du réfugié revenant chez lui était corrélée avec une
perspective plus favorable sur le retour.
Introduction
The plight of refugees and other people displaced from their
homes by uncontrolled violence or deliberate ethnic expul-
sion has been well documented and has received increasing
attention from scholars, practitioners, and the international
community over the past decade.1 Millions of these refugees
find shelter in large camps run by UNHCR and collaborat-
ing NGOs, where they may “temporarily” reside for years
and sometimes for decades. From this distance, across their
country’s borders, refugees often dream of someday return-
ing, in part because, despite the events that may have pre-
cipitated their flight, feeling “at home” is viewed as a comfort
that only their homeland can provide.2
But numerous researchers have documented how repa-
triation often proves to be significantly less rewarding and
far more disillusioning than the resilient refugees who re-
turn home had anticipated3 – due to a variety of factors
including resentment from stayees, being perceived as out-
siders, disinterest in their stories, stressful economic cir-
cumstances, and unexpected changes during their time
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away.4 In short, as Harrell-Bond and Gatson have observed:
“Because the return is so strongly associated in the minds
of exiles with the end of a traumatic period, the unexpected
differences and difficulties can make going ‘home’ even
more painful than the original exile.”5
A particular setting where many of these issues and dy-
namics are currently salient is the Kakuma camp in Kenya,
temporary haven to thousands of refugees from southern
Sudan. During 2004–2005, UNHCR developed a repatria-
tion plan to assist those refugees who want to return home.
With this opportunity on the horizon, in the fall of 2005 we
surveyed a sample of these refugees in Kakuma to assess their
desire to return to Sudan, their emotional reactions at the
prospect, their view of the ongoing peace process, the reac-
tions they anticipated from stayees in Sudan, and the logisti-
cal challenges they expected to encounter. In addition, we
were especially interested in how certain beliefs might bear
upon their preferences and their perceptions of the road that
lay ahead. Before describing these beliefs, some background
on the Kakuma Refugee Camp is warranted.
Kakuma Refugee Camp and Its South Sudanese
Refugees
Kakuma  refugee camp was  originally established  for  the
12,000 Sudanese minors who arrived in 1992, and since that
time they have been joined by refugees from other nationali-
ties and by thousands more Sudanese. Some have been reset-
tled to third countries, such as the United States, Australia,
and Canada, but many have been living in Kakuma for more
than ten years. Those who came as children have been edu-
cated and have grown to adulthood in Kakuma; many chil-
dren have been born here and have never seen Sudan.
The opportunities for refugees in Kakuma to improve
their lives are limited. Kenyan government policy dictates
that refugees are not allowed to live freely, but must stay in
one of two camps (Kakuma or Dadaab). In Kakuma, refugees
are not allowed to keep animals, since this is likely to increase
conflict between the refugees and the local Turkana people.
The semi-arid environment is not conducive to growing
crops. It is possible for refugees to start small businesses, if
the capital is available (either through a loan from an NGO
or with money sent by family abroad). However, the market
is finite because Kakuma is in a very isolated area and the
majority of customers are other refugees, a small number of
NGO staff, and local Kenyans. All NGOs in the camp “em-
ploy” refugees, but due to Kenyan laws prohibiting employ-
ment of refugees, they are engaged on a voluntary basis and
then paid an “incentive,” which is far lower than a wage
would be for a Kenyan in an equivalent job.
Life in Kakuma, therefore, is hard, and the Sudanese
community in the camp has placed a great deal of hope in
the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),
which was signed on 9 January 2005. Many expect that this
will enable them to leave Kakuma to return to a new and
peaceful Sudan, where they will have opportunities to live
more comfortable and fulfilling lives. Agencies such as
UNHCR are also anticipating that most Sudanese refugees
in Kakuma (as well as other parts of Kenya, Uganda, Ethio-
pia, Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic
of Congo) will indeed return home. This process is not,
however, expected to occur rapidly, because South Sudan
currently lacks many basic facilities such as schools, hospi-
tals, and roads, and much of the land is contaminated with
mines.
UNHCR has developed a repatriation plan to assist those
refugees who want to return. In addition to assisting return-
ees logistically (e.g., providing transport), the plan includes
providing information, non-food items (e.g., cooking pots,
blankets),  and protection to those returning; registering,
monitoring, and tracking returnees; and ensuring there is the
capacity to respond to emergencies. The assisted voluntary
repatriation process was anticipated to begin once the rainy
season ended in Sudan (i.e., from October 2005 onwards),
and to continue until May 2006, when the rains begin again
and transportation becomes impossible due to the lack of
paved roads. In July 2004 UNHCR anticipated that 30,000
Sudanese refugees would return from Kakuma in the eight-
een months after the signing of the CPA.6 However, it appears
that this was overly optimistic. UNHCR revised its estimate
with the expectation of 10,000 refugees being repatriated by
the time the rains were to begin in May 2006.
The downward revision in large measure reflects recent
political changes in Sudan resulting from the untimely death
of Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the charismatic and influen-
tial leader of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
Garang was killed in a helicopter crash on 30 July 2005, three
weeks after being sworn in as the first vice-president of the
new Sudan. As the leader of the SPLA, Garang led the rebel-
lion against the Khartoum government for twenty-two years.
He was an exceptional politician, and one of the few senior
southerners who  genuinely believed in the  concept  of  a
united Sudan. For many South Sudanese, hopes and aspira-
tions for a peaceful and prosperous future for their country
were very much bound up with the figure of John Garang.
The resulting sense  of  uncertainty  has apparently led to
reluctance amongst many Sudanese in Kakuma to return
home immediately; instead, they want to wait and see how
things develop in their homeland before returning. In re-
sponse to this uncertainty, UNHCR Kakuma organized “go-
and-see” missions, in which groups of Sudanese community
leaders from the camp were taken to South Sudan to see the
situation for themselves, and were then brought back to
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Kakuma, where they were expected to pass on the informa-
tion to members of their communities. However, the news
that the facilities in Sudan were minimal did little to reassure
refugees that the time was right for them to return.
As a result of this combination of factors, the launch of
the assisted repatriation process on 17 December 2005 saw
only 131 refugees return, some by plane and some by bus,
to Kapoeta, Chukudum, and Bor. According to UNHCR,
1,600 refugees have registered for return to Sudan as soon
as possible, and they still expect to repatriate 10,000 from
Kakuma by May 2006 and to have repatriated all Sudanese
refugees within the next four years. However, it is worth
noting that in the same week that 131 refugees were offi-
cially repatriated from Kakuma, over 200 were received
from Sudan. South Sudanese refugees continue to come to
Kakuma in significant numbers, primarily due to hunger
but also due to militia attacks in the south. Kakuma also
receives a number of refugees from Darfur.
The Role of Refugees’ Core Beliefs in Deciding
Whether to Return Home
Eidelson and Eidelson have proposed that certain beliefs are
particularly influential because they operate simultaneously
as core beliefs fundamental to the daily existential experi-
ences of individuals and as collective worldviews pivotal to
the central concerns and shared narratives of groups.7 They
identify five specific content domains that meet this dual
standard: namely, beliefs about vulnerability, injustice, dis-
trust, superiority, and helplessness. The extent to which
these deeply held beliefs are healthy and functional depends
in large measure on whether or not they are accurate reflec-
tions of institutional realities and other real-world condi-
tions. Whether from the perspective of an individual or a
group, each of the five domains represents a personal or
collective arena where beliefs can often encourage the exag-
geration or underestimation of the risks and burdens cur-
rently faced or lying ahead.
In our survey we were interested in determining whether
this five-belief framework would be useful in under-
standing how the Sudanese refugees in Kakuma felt about
the prospect of returning home and how they perceived the
situation that would await them there. Since an extensive
discussion of these five domains is available elsewhere,8
here we provide only a brief summary of the central features
of each, with a particular focus on its relevance for refugees
at Kakuma (based in part on observations from the second
author’s work in the camp over the past three years).
Clearly, exploring the potential impact of these beliefs can
prove valuable only if they have meaning and relevance
within the specific social and cultural context to which they
are applied.9
Vulnerability
The vulnerability belief, whether applied to one’s personal
world or to the experience of one’s group, is characterized
by the conviction that the world is a dangerous and risky
place, where safety and security are difficult to obtain and
catastrophic loss lurks on the horizon.10 It often includes a
tendency to focus on the likelihood of dire outcomes, which
at the group level may originate in perceptions of the in-
group’s history as one of misery and oppression. As such,
current peril and an uncertain future would appear to be
defining features of the experience of many refugees and the
groups with which they identify. In the Kakuma context,
Sudanese refugees regularly describe themselves as under
attack, not only by the northern Sudanese government but
also by other groups in South Sudan. For example, the Dinka
and Nuer tribes have a long history of conflict, which has
continued to some degree in the camp, and each group
perceives the other as likely to harm them if an opportunity
arises.
Injustice
The injustice belief is based on the individual’s perceptions
of being personally mistreated by others or the view that
in-group members receive undeserved, substandard, and
unjust outcomes, perhaps due to a biased or rigged system
created by a more powerful outgroup.11 Such beliefs typi-
cally heighten identification and allegiance toward the in-
group,12 and they can mobilize powerful and violent
collective insurgencies.13 The injustice mindset is frequently
linked to a historical perspective that emphasizes past epi-
sodes or periods of abuse and exploitation at the hands of
others, which again can be a very prominent element of the
refugee experience. In the Kakuma context, this belief is held
most strongly by South Sudanese refugees in relation to the
northern Sudanese government, which they believe has op-
pressed and exploited them for decades. However, such
convictions are also held by some South Sudanese groups
about each other. For example, at the time of writing, Nuer,
Dinka Bor, and Dinka Bar el-Ghazal leaders in South Sudan
are negotiating to resolve a conflict stemming from the Nuer
group’s belief that they are being treated unjustly in terms
of the number of ministerial posts given to members of their
tribe compared with those given to the other two groups.
Distrust
The distrust belief focuses on the presumed hostility and
malicious intent of other individuals or other groups. In
reference to the personal world, this mindset may range
from a predisposition toward suspicion and anticipated
deceit to outright paranoia. At the group level, the convic-
tion that outsiders harbour malevolent designs toward the
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in-group is  sufficiently widespread  that “dishonest” and
“untrustworthy” are considered to be central elements in the
universal stereotype of outgroups.14 Here too, refugees
would seem to have a particularly strong basis for developing
a distrust mindset. In regard to refugees in Kakuma, it is
important to recall that there have been previous peace
agreements in Sudan, all of which have been broken. Most
notably, the 1972 Addis Ababa Accord was progressively
breached by the northern government, which was intent on
controlling the oil fields in the south. Their introduction of
Sharia law and other steps towards Islamization of the south
triggered the resumption of the war in 1983. For most South
Sudanese, therefore, it is difficult to believe in the northern
government’s commitment to the peace agreement, and
there is great distrust of the northern regime generally.15
Superiority
The superiority belief revolves around the conviction that
the individual or the in-group is morally superior, chosen,
entitled, or destined for greatness—and the corresponding
view that others are contemptible, immoral, and inferior.16
At the group level, this mindset can be used to explain,
legitimize, and ruthlessly enforce in-group status advan-
tages17 – or to advance the claim that current deprivations
are temporary and inappropriate. It is this latter perspective
that may capture a potentially key aspect of some refugee
groups’ understanding of their circumstances. Anecdotally,
among refugees at Kakuma negative perceptions of mem-
bers of other groups were more evident than was a narcis-
sistic view of their own group’s worth. For example, Dinka
and Nuer refugees often talk about the negative charac-
teristics of the other group; they are also very critical about
the Muslim religion and lifestyle of the northern Sudanese.
Helplessness
Finally, the helplessness belief refers to the conviction that
the individual or the in-group is unable to favourably influ-
ence or control events and outcomes.18 Even when it does
not accurately represent objective reality, this belief tends to
be self-perpetuating because it diminishes motivation.19 At
the group level, since an effective social movement is inher-
ently risky and depends upon the promise of some reason-
able likelihood of success, organized political mobilization
is severely hampered when group members perceive their
in-group to be helpless to alter its circumstances. Although
one might imagine that refugees could be particularly prone
to see themselves as helpless, anecdotally this does not seem
to be the case in regard to Kakuma’s South Sudanese refu-
gees. Rather, most of them appear to take considerable pride
in the groups to which they belong, whether a clan group, a
tribal group, or the larger group of “south Sudanese,” and
they believe  that these groups have power and efficacy.
Indeed, in many ways the helplessness belief appears to be
antithetical to Sudanese culture.
The Personal Beliefs of Sudanese Refugees about
Their Group
Eidelson and his colleagues have provided a further elabo-
ration of this five-domain model.20 Of particular relevance
here, they have emphasized how individual differences in
members’ personal beliefs about their in-group can be po-
tentially important factors in explaining variation in their
preferences, choices, and perceptions of the group’s collec-
tive circumstances. Applying this framework to the Kakuma
setting, we hypothesized that differences among the Suda-
nese refugees in the extent to which they believed their group
would be vulnerable, mistreated, in need of a distrustful
posture, superior, or helpless if they returned home would
predict how they would view the prospect of repatriating. In
particular we expected that stronger beliefs about the group
in the vulnerability, injustice, distrust, and helplessness do-
mains would be associated with a diminished desire to
return to Sudan and with less favourable assessments of what
life in Sudan would be like, while stronger convictions of
in-group superiority would be linked to greater eagerness to
repatriate and a more positive outlook on what the future
there might hold.
Our interest in examining these specific hypothesized
relationships and in evaluating the five-domain model
more generally was motivated by the recognition that the
psychological and informational bases upon which refugees
make repatriation decisions can have very important impli-
cations for their welfare and future adjustment. Any frame-
work that facilitates the identification of key issues and
improves the process for prioritizing, organizing, and dis-
cussing available information about “home” (or other po-
tential destinations) within the context of core concerns
should be of value to the prospective returnees themselves
and to the humanitarian aid workers striving to best assist
and represent them.
Method
Participants
Participants (N = 23) were recruited from all areas of the
Kakuma camp. All were Sudanese and Christian, and 68.1
per cent were male (although the gender balance was closer
to 60 per cent male in the camp as a whole). The participants’
agesranged fromsixteentoeighty-five(M=31.43,SD=10.97),
with no significant age differences between the men and the
women (for those sixteen and older, the respondents’ age
distribution closely mirrored that of the camp for the female
participants, but the proportion of young males in the camp
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was under-represented in the survey sample). Twenty-two
tribes were represented, with the largest number of partici-
pants describing themselves as Dinka (62.1 per cent). Other
significant groups were Nuer (8.5 per cent), Didinga (7.7 per
cent), and Acholi (5.1 per cent). The other eighteen tribes
comprise the remaining 16.6 per cent of the sample.
The refugees surveyed had been living in Kakuma for
between one and fifteen years (M = 9.31, SD = 3.54), with
males having spent more time in the camp than women
[t(233) = 2.09, p = .037]. Of the participants, 90.6 per cent
had at least one other relative also living in the camp (M =
6.27, SD = 5.18). The number of years’ schooling ranged
between zero and nineteen (M = 8.64, SD = 4.65), with 85.0
per cent of the respondents having had some level of formal
education. On average the women had received significantly
less schooling than the men [t(232) = –8.78, p < .001]. The
majority (60.4 per cent) did not have paid employment. Of
those who were employed, 88.2 per cent were male and
almost all were working for NGOs in the camp, as would
be expected. They were engaged in a range of work, includ-
ing teaching, health-related work, and social work or coun-
sellling. Wages for those with paid employment ranged
considerably, from 100 to 8,000 Kenyan shillings (approxi-
mately $1.40 to $110) per month (M = 2,960 KES, SD = 945).
Most NGOs in Kakuma pay 3,000 KES per month to their
non-supervisory staff, and two-thirds of the employed par-
ticipants in the sample earned this amount.
Procedure
Participants were recruited by refugees working with the
Jesuit Refugee Service’s Community Counseling program,
which is managed by the second author. Fifteen community
counsellors volunteered to assist with the data collection,
and they were trained by the second author in issues relating
to informed consent, sampling procedures, and the comple-
tion of the survey. The counsellors took the number of
surveys they thought it would be possible to have completed
by people in their communities (this varied between three
and twenty-five). Each counsellor lives and works in a dif-
ferent community and different groups of potential partici-
pants were thereby enlisted. The counsellors were asked to
try to recruit a group of people representative of their com-
munity in terms of gender, age (although none less than
sixteen years old), education, and employment status.
The educational level of older refugees in Kakuma, who
have not attended school in the camp, tends to be low,
especially amongst women. Counsellors were therefore also
trained in how to assist those unable to read the survey.
Since in some cases it would be necessary to read each
question to the participant, and in many other cases people
would read very slowly, it was necessary to keep the survey
relatively short. For the same reason, the items needed to
be worded very simply, to ensure that they would be under-
stood by all potential participants.
Once the training was completed, counsellors were given
two weeks (24 October to 7 November 2005) to recruit
participants and have them complete the surveys. At the
end of that period, they submitted the completed surveys
to the second author. The surveys were then quality-
checked, and any discrepancies or missing data discussed
with the counsellor responsible and corrected if possible.
Data entry was performed by the second author.
Survey Measures
Unless otherwise specified, all of the items assessing the
refugees’ attitudes about returning home to Sudan were
measured using the jerry can image technique described
below and then coded using a scale of 0 (I do not agree) to 3
(I agree strongly).
Personal Beliefs about the Sudanese Refugee Group in
Kakuma. The Individual-Group Belief Inventory (IGBI)
developed by the first author was adapted to measure the
respondents’ beliefs about their refugee group.21 In its
standard form, the IGBI measures each of the five belief
domains – vulnerability, injustice, distrust, superiority, and
helplessness—at each of three levels of analysis (personal
beliefs about the personal world, personal beliefs about the
in-group, and personal perceptions of the in-group’s col-
lective worldviews) – using a five-point Likert-type scale
ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). In
this survey we focused on one level of analysis only: per-
sonal beliefs about the in-group.
Several content and format changes were made in order
to make the IGBI appropriate for use in the Kakuma con-
text. First, we decided to modify the items so that they
focused on beliefs about returning home to Sudan rather
than on current circumstances at the camp. Second, based
on the guidance of the second author and camp counsellors,
the original IGBI item content was changed where neces-
sary so that the language and ideas were readily comprehen-
sible by this refugee sample. A first draft of the survey was
shared with eight Sudanese community counsellors. The
second author discussed each item with this group of com-
munity counsellors and those items thought to be confus-
ing or unclear were revised by the counsellors into a format
which they felt would be understood by potential partici-
pants. Third, the standard answer format for the IGBI was
modified significantly. The respondents were asked to an-
swer each item on the equivalent of a four-point scale: I do
not agree, I agree slightly, I agree, and I agree strongly. An-
swers were indicated by filling in different levels of a small
jerry can image (an object very familiar to Kakuma refu-
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gees), so that filling the jerry can higher represented greater
agreement with the item; this approach was modelled after
a similar strategy described by Annan et al. and used in
Uganda.22 This method necessitated eliminating the sym-
metrical bipolar continuum of the standard IGBI items
because there was no way to represent conditions where
there was less than no water in the jerry can (“I do not agree”
corresponded to leaving the jerry can empty). The items
used are listed in Table 1 (one of the three original helpless-
ness items was not used because it was unexpectedly nega-
tively correlated with the other two helplessness items).
Table 1. Individual-Group Belief
Inventory (IGBI) Items
Vulnerability
. I believe that Kakuma refugees who return to Southern
Sudan will not be secure.
. I believe that Kakuma refugees who return to Southern
Sudan must be always alert for possible danger.
. I believe that Kakuma refugees who return to Southern
Sudan will not be safe.
Injustice
. I believe other groups will often be unfair to Kakuma refu-
gees who return to Southern Sudan.
. I believe Kakuma refugees who return to Southern Sudan
will be blamed by other groups more than they should be.
. I believe that the good things done by Kakuma refugees who
return to Southern Sudan will never be appreciated.
Distrust
. I believe Kakuma refugees who return to Southern Sudan
should expect bad treatment from other groups.
. If given the chance, I believe that other groups will try to
deceive Kakuma refugees who return to Southern Sudan.
. I believe Kakuma refugees who return to Southern Sudan
generally should not trust other groups.
Superiority
. I believe Kakuma refugees who return to Southern Sudan
will be better than other groups in their ways of doing
things.
. I believe that Kakuma refugees who return to Southern
Sudan will do better than other groups.
. I believe Kakuma refugees who return to Southern Sudan
will contribute more to their communities than other
groups.
Helplessness
. I believe that the future of Kakuma refugees who return to
Southern Sudan will not be very good.
. I believe that what happens to Kakuma refugees who return
to Southern Sudan will be in the hands of other groups.
Preference for Retuning Home, Resettlement, and Remain-
ing in Kakuma. Three individual items each assessed the
refugees’ attitudes toward returning home to Sudan (“I
want to return home to live in Sudan very much”), reset-
tling elsewhere (“I want to be resettled in another country
very much”), and staying in the Kakuma camp (“I want to
remain and live in Kakuma very much”).
Emotional  Reactions to  Returning Home. The  respon-
dents’ comparative positive versus negative emotional re-
actions toward the prospect of returning home to Sudan
were measured with four items: “When I think about re-
turning to live in Sudan I feel happy,” “When I think about
returning to live in Sudan I feel frightened” (reverse-
scored), “When I think about returning to live in Sudan I
feel angry” (reverse-scored), and “When I think about re-
turning to live in Sudan I feel sad” (reverse-scored).
Peace Prospects in Sudan. The respondents’ view of the
prospects for peace in Sudan was measured with four items:
“I strongly support the current peace agreement in Sudan,”
“There will now be peace in Sudan for a very long time,”
“All the people of Sudan can learn to live together in peace,”
and “The people of Southern Sudan will prosper now that
there is peace.”
Hostile Treatment upon Return. The respondents’ sense
of whether they would be viewed and treated negatively
upon their return to Sudan was measured with three items:
“If I return to Sudan, I will be welcomed back by those in
my family and tribe who stayed in Sudan during the con-
flict” (reverse-scored), “If I return to Sudan, those in my
family and tribe who stayed in Sudan during the conflict
will treat me unfairly,” and “If I return to Sudan, I will be
seen as an ‘outsider’ by those in my family and tribe who
stayed in Sudan during the conflict.”
Concerns over Returning Home to Sudan. The respon-
dents’ concerns over returning to Sudan were measured
using six items: “When I think about returning to Sudan, I
am  very worried about security,” “When I think about
returning to Sudan, I am very worried about mines,”
“When I think about returning to Sudan, I am very worried
about the roads and transportation,” “When I think about
returning to Sudan, I am very worried about education,”
“When I think about returning to Sudan, I am very worried
about how I will support myself and my family,” and
“When I think about returning to Sudan, I am very worried
about how I will get clean water.” These are familiar areas
of concern for refugees, and this specific list was drawn
from a 2004 UNHCR report on repatriation to Sudan that
identified them as primary concerns for returning refu-
gees.23
Volume 25 Refuge Number 1
20
Results
Table 2  presents the survey items related to returning
home to Sudan, including some items that were not used
in constructing the criterion measures described above.
The percentage figures in the table represent the com-
bined percentage of participants who responded “agree”
or “strongly agree” to each item. Table 3 presents the
means and standard deviations for the variables used in
this study, as well as the Cronbach alphas for the compos-
ite measures.
Table 2. Combined Percentage of “Agree” and
“Strongly Agree” Responses to Key Survey Items
Survey Item
%
Agreement
I want to return home to live in Sudan very much. 73.6
I want to be resettled in another country very
much.
37.0
I want to remain and live in Kakuma very much. 6.8
I have been following the news about Sudan very
closely.
70.6
I strongly support the current peace agreement in
Sudan.
77.4
There will now be peace in Sudan for a very long
time.
43.8
All the people of Sudan can learn to live together
in peace.
65.1
I am willing to forgive the people who have
harmed me and my people.
63.0
The people of Southern Sudan will prosper now
that there is peace.
60.4
The past years have been more difficult for
Sudanese refugees than for those who stayed in
Southern Sudan.
47.6
It is important to identify and punish the
perpetrators involved in the Sudanese conflict.
51.5
I trust the new government in Sudan. 29.4
If I return to Sudan, I will be welcomed back by
those in my family and tribe who stayed in Sudan
during the conflict.
78.7
If I return to Sudan, those in my family and tribe
who stayed in Sudan during the conflict will treat
me unfairly.
19.6
If I return to Sudan, I will be seen as an “outsider”
by those in my family and tribe who stayed in
Sudan during the conflict.
29.5
I intend to return home to live in Sudan sometime
within the next year.
41.3
When I think about returning to live in Sudan I
feel happy.
73.2
When I think about returning to live in Sudan I
feel frightened.
41.3
When I think about returning to live in Sudan I
feel angry.
17.0
When I think about returning to live in Sudan I
feel sad.
20.9
When I think about returning to Sudan, I am very
worried about security.
77.0
When I think about returning to Sudan, I am very
worried about mines.
87.2
When I think about returning to Sudan, I am very
worried about the roads and transportation.
80.4
When I think about returning to Sudan, I am very
worried about education.
80.9
When I think about returning to Sudan, I am very
worried about how I will support myself and my
family.
68.5
When I think about returning to Sudan, I am very
worried about how I will get clean water.
70.6
It is safer for me to live in Kakuma than to live in
Sudan.
33.2
I can earn a better living in Kakuma than in Sudan. 23.0
The schools are better in Kakuma than in Sudan. 85.5
Hospitals and medical care are better in Kakuma
than in Sudan.
68.1
Women deserve greater freedom and rights than
they now have in Sudan.
70.6
There are big problems in Sudan between the
youth and the old.
48.9
I have a lot of contact with those refugees who
have already returned to Sudan.
32.9
I know a lot about what is going on right now in
Sudan.
53.8
I am very concerned about how the Northern
Sudanese will react if I return to Southern Sudan.
62.6
I am very concerned about how fellow South
Sudanese will react if I return to Southern Sudan.
40.9
Note. N = 235.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach Alphas
M SD Alpha
Personal Beliefs about the Refugee Group
Vulnerability 1.47 0.76 0.54
Injustice 1.26 0.75 0.57
Distrust 1.30 0.79 0.59
Superiority 2.40 0.66 0.64
lplessness 1.05 0.84 0.43
Attitudes about Returning Home
I want to return home 2.15 1.08 –
I want to be resettled 1.19 1.25 –
Optimistic about peace in Sudan 1.82 0.73 0.75
Expects hostility upon returning home 0.77 0.77 0.84
More positive than negative emotions 2.15 0.85 0.65
Worried about problems upon return 2.18 0.67 0.78
Note. N = 235. All scales range from 0 (I Do Not Agree)
to 3 (I Agree Strongly).
Attitudes about Returning Home
The vast majority of respondents reported that they wanted
to leave Kakuma. Only 6.8 per cent either agreed or strongly
agreed that they wanted to stay in the camp. It is also clear
that they much preferred to return home to Sudan than to
be resettled in some unspecified other country. 73.6 per cent
agreed or strongly agreed that they wanted to return home,
whereas a substantially smaller 37.0 per cent expressed a
comparable level of support for being resettled elsewhere.
Moreover, in a direct comparison of these two departure
options, 62.6 per cent preferred Sudan to resettlement else-
where, 11.1 per cent were indifferent between the two
choices, and 26.3 per cent preferred resettlement to repatria-
tion. It should be noted, however, that the percentage who
reported that they actually expected to return home some-
time in the next year (41.3 per cent) was much smaller than
the percentage who wanted to return (73.6 per cent).
Overall, the respondent group had a positive perspective
in regard to Sudan’s future and their own lives if given the
opportunity to repatriate. A large majority of the respon-
dents reported a predominance of positive over negative
emotions when they anticipated returning home: happy
(73.2 per cent), fearful (41.3 per cent), angry (17.0 per
cent), and sad (20.9 per cent). This divergence was even
more apparent among those refugees eager to return (i.e.,
a response of “agree” or “strongly agree” on that item). A
majority also had a favourable view of the prospects 7for
peace in Sudan despite the recent death of SPLA leader John
Garang de Mabior: 60.9 per cent scored above the midpoint
on the four-item peace prospects criterion measure (how-
ever, only 29.4 per cent expressed trust in the new Sudanese
government). Similarly, only a small minority (18.7 per
cent) scored above the midpoint on the three-item measure
assessing whether the respondents expected a negative re-
ception upon their return home. At the same time, large
majorities did acknowledge worries in specific domains.
Agreement or strong agreement over concerns about secu-
rity, mines, roads, education, money, and water was re-
ported by 77.0 per cent, 87.2 per cent, 80.4 per cent, 80.9
per cent, 68.5 per cent, and 70.6 per cent respectively. Based
on these figures, it appears that the refugees were not naïve
in their impressions of some of the challenges they would
face upon returning to Sudan.
Beliefs about the Refugee Group and Attitudes about
Returning Home
Table 4 presents the correlations among the key variables in
the survey. It should be noted that all of the IGBI belief scales
except for superiority were significantly correlated with each
other, and that in general the criterion measures were cor-
related with each other as well. As the table indicates, at the
level of zero-order correlations our hypotheses were consis-
tently confirmed across all measures: stronger beliefs about
group vulnerability, injustice, distrust, and helplessness
were linked to a more negative outlook on repatriation, and
a stronger group superiority belief was associated with a
more positive perspective toward returning home. In addi-
tion, as one might expect, the five belief scales had exactly
the reverse relationships to the respondents’ desire to resettle
elsewhere. It should be noted that desire to repatriate and
desire to resettle were significantly negatively correlated with
each other.
In light of these correlations, a separate regression analy-
sis using the five IGBI scales as predictor variables was
conducted for each of the repatriation-focused criterion
measures in order to determine (1) how much explanatory
power was provided by this combined set of beliefs and (2)
whether each belief domain contributed uniquely to ex-
plaining individual differences in attitudes toward return-
ing home. Table 5 presents the summary statistics for these
models. Demographic variables were not included as co-
variates in these analyses; however, parallel regressions
were performed including covariates and the results were
comparable to those reported here.
The variable of primary interest was the single item
assessing whether the respondents wanted to return home
to Sudan. This regression model accounted for nearly one-
third of the variance in the criterion measure, producing an
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R2 = .30 [F(5,229) = 19.46, p < .001]. In this model both
vulnerability and injustice beliefs in regard to their refugee
group made significant unique contributions in predicting
a diminished desire to return home, while a conviction
about the group’s superiority was significantly linked to a
greater desire to repatriate.
A similar but even stronger pattern emerged in regard to
the model predicting the respondents’ emotional reactions
to the prospect of returning home, yielding an R2 = .44
[F(5,229) = 36.18, p < .001]. Beliefs about group vulner-
ability, injustice, and superiority again operated in the same
manner as in the model predicting desire to return, but a
belief that the group should be distrustful was also a signifi-
cant predictor, associated with more negative emotional
reactions when thinking about returning home.
Compared to the prediction of emotional reactions, be-
liefs about the in-group were significantly but less strongly
linked to the refugees’ view of the evolving peace process in
Sudan: R2 = .17 [F(5,229) = 9.41, p < .001]. In this model
only two beliefs made significant independent contribu-
tions. A belief in the  group’s superiority was linked  to
greater optimism about the peace process while the distrust
Table 4. Inter-Correlations among Key Survey Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Vulnerability Belief .50 .40 –.05 .44 –.35 .32 –.43 –.15 .29 .46
2. Injustice Belief .63 .06 .52 –.37 .29 –.47 –.26 .45 .34
3. Distrust Belief. .08 .47 –.29 .22 –.43 –.29 .38 .27
4. Superiority Belief- –.03 .34 .24 .36 .25 –.22 –.08
5. Helplessness Belief –.27 .27 –.38 –.19 .36 .25
6. Want to Return Home –.52 .67 .53 –.44 –.27
7. Want to be Resettled- –.49 –.28 .39 .27
8. Primarily Positive Emotions .54 –.56 –.34
9. Good Prospects for Peace- –.34 –.10
10. Unfavourable Reception Likely .30
11. Concerned about Problems
Note: N = 235. For |r| > .12, p < .05; for |r| > .17, p < .01; for |r| > .23, p < .001.
Table 5. Regression Summary Statistics
Criterion Measures
Desire to
Return Home
Positive
Emotions
Optimism
about Peace
Negative
Reception
Anticipated
Problems
Vulnerability ß -.17** -.19** .03 .01 .37***
Injustice ß -.23** -.23** -.14 .30*** .14
Distrust ß -.09 -.21** -.22** .15* .04
Superiority ß .36*** .38*** .28*** -.24*** -.07
Helplessness ß -.02 -.07 -.02 .11 -.01
F(5,229) 19.46*** 36.18*** 9.41*** 18.83*** 13.86***
R2 .30 .44 .17 .29 .23
Note. N = 235.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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belief was associated with a less positive assessment of the
prospects for peace.
The five-belief model also explained nearly one-third of
the variance in the criterion measure assessing whether the
respondents expected a negative reception upon returning
home to Sudan: R2 = .29 [F(5,229) = 18.83, p < .001]. In
this model, the injustice belief made the largest unique
contribution and, along with the distrust belief, was linked
to greater expectations that the group would encounter
hostility back home in Sudan. In contrast, the superiority
belief was associated with a diminished expectation that the
refugees would be faced with animosity or resentment upon
their return.
The final criterion measure was the extent to which the
refugees were concerned about encountering various prob-
lems upon their return home. The IGBI belief predictors
produced an R2 = .23 [F(5,229) = 13.86, p < .001], account-
ing for almost one-quarter of the variance in this measure.
However, the vulnerability belief was the only one of the
five that was significantly linked to these concerns, with
those holding stronger vulnerability beliefs reporting
greater worries.
Discussion
The vast majority of our respondents reported that they very
much wanted to return home to Sudan, even though they
simultaneously acknowledged that they would in all likeli-
hood face significant challenges posed by inadequate secu-
rity, mines, roads in disrepair, limited educational
opportunities, likely financial difficulties, and limited access
to potable water. This eagerness to repatriate, perhaps even
more surprising following the death of John Garang, speaks
to the strength and resiliency of these refugees and to the
profound meaning of “home” and the powerful sentiments
attached to it. By and large, our respondents were predomi-
nantly elated at the prospect of returning, they were hopeful
that the peace process would move forward successfully, and
they expected to be well-received by those they had left
behind. At the same time, it should be noted that fewer than
half of the respondents actually expected to return to Sudan
over the next twelve months, and in fact the initial UNHCR
program in December 2005 proved to be disappointing in
the relative paucity of refugees who actually left Kakuma for
Sudan.
Our  investigation of  whether  the five belief domains
highlighted by Eidelson and Eidelson are useful for under-
standing how refugees view repatriation yielded promising
preliminary  results.24 As  hypothesized,  four of the core
beliefs—about group vulnerability, injustice, distrust, and
helplessness upon returning home—were linked to a di-
minished desire for repatriation, and to more negative
assessments about the peace process and the reception they
would receive in Sudan (and indeed these beliefs tended to
instead support a preference for resettlement elsewhere). In
contrast, across our survey measures a strong belief in their
refugee group’s superiority was consistently linked with
respondents’ greater desire to repatriate and a more opti-
mistic perspective on how events would unfold once back
home. Speculatively, this may suggest that these refugees
were confident that their group could successfully stake its
claims and emerge “on top” in the new Sudan, perhaps in
part  because of  skills and  experience obtained  while  at
Kakuma. This positive image of their group may serve these
prospective returnees well—in contrast, for example, to
convictions of group helplessness—but in-group biases in
other contexts have regularly been linked with derogation
of outgroups and hostility toward them.25 This potential
“dark side”  of  superiority beliefs and group pride may
warrant close attention as  harbingers of renewed inter-
group conflict following repatriation.
An important question should be raised here: Do the
refugees’ beliefs about their group reflect accurate assess-
ments of the circumstances they will face in Sudan or are
they subjective distortions involving either overestimates or
underestimates of the challenges they will confront? Since
there was significant variation among the respondents in
their IGBI responses, it would be valuable to know whose
convictions were more closely aligned with the “facts on the
ground” in Sudan. Our survey measures were prospective
in nature, and they do not provide an answer in this regard.
However, what is clear is that the refugees’ beliefs were
strongly linked to individual differences among them in
how they viewed the prospect of repatriation. Assessments
of these beliefs in relation to “objective” information about
circumstances awaiting refugees back home may therefore
be a fruitful avenue for intervention by counsellors and
others in positions of responsibility for repatriation pro-
grams. Group or individual discussions may provide op-
portunities to explore—and in some cases “correct” (in
either direction)—refugees’ important convictions about
issues over group (or personal) vulnerability, injustice, dis-
trust, superiority, and helplessness. It is also worth noting
that the same five core beliefs may also be important after
returning home in regard to how successfully the refugees
reintegrate into the community they had left behind.
From a methodological perspective, the Individual-
Group Belief Inventory was adapted for this survey to focus
on the refugees’ beliefs in regard to what it might be like for
them—as  a group—to return  home. Time available  for
survey administration did not allow us to collect additional
IGBI-related data, but it would have been interesting to also
learn more about how the refugees viewed both the pros-
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pect of resettlement elsewhere and their current situation
in Kakuma in regard to issues of vulnerability, injustice,
distrust, superiority, and helplessness. The strength of these
beliefs could then have been compared with the beliefs
about returning to Sudan to determine whether attitudes
toward repatriation in part reflected an implicit cost-bene-
fit analysis of the merits of going home along these five key
dimensions. In addition, collecting IGBI data regarding the
refugees’ beliefs about their own personal worlds (i.e.,
rather than their convictions about their group) might have
been valuable. This would have allowed a comparison of
whether beliefs about the self or  the  group were  more
important in determining the respondents’ perspectives on
repatriation.
Certain limitations of our study should be highlighted.
First, our survey data were based entirely on self-report and
are therefore subject to the concerns associated with this
approach. In addition, the reliability coefficients for several
of our measures were not as high as would be desirable.
Similarly, our analyses are correlational in nature, and
therefore issues of causality in regard to relationships
among variables cannot be demonstrated. However, some
relationships are more plausible than others, and it is our
judgment that beliefs about vulnerability, injustice, dis-
trust, helplessness, and superiority may  indeed serve as
causal influences on judgments about repatriation. At the
same time, the limits of the survey include the fact that time
and other considerations prevented collection of other data
that might bear directly on the relationships found. For
example, we did not gather information on why individual
refugees had left Sudan or on the lives they had led before
fleeing. Finally, it should be noted that women were under-
represented in our survey (women comprise approximately
50 per cent of the Kakuma population, but only 32 per cent
of this sample). This may have occurred because all of the
counsellors who volunteered to assist with this research
were male, and it can be difficult for Sudanese men to
approach Sudanese women. Most of the Kakuma counsel-
lors are in fact male, because women tend to have a lower
level of education (e.g., counsellors are required to speak
English) and they tend to have more outside-of-work com-
mitments than the men (e.g., taking care of the home and
family).
Caution is also in order when considering generalization
of our findings to other refugee settings. While not unique,
the Kakuma camp has its distinctive features—as does every
camp and every group of refugees. As one example, many
of the refugees in Kakuma have been there for many years.
Those minors who came in 1992 and who were not resettled
in the United States have grown up in the camp, and in
many cases they now have children of their own who have
never set foot in Sudan. Their knowledge of Sudan, there-
fore, may be unrealistic and perhaps idealistic. However,
the SPLA has had a significant presence and influence in the
camp, so in some ways there has continued to be a strong
connection between Kakuma and South Sudan. Since the
CPA was signed, many of the SPLA commanders who were
in Kakuma have been summoned back to Sudan to take up
posts in the new government. Kakuma is very close to the
Sudanese border, and there has been continual movement
between the two; refugees might return to Sudan for a short
period if a family member in Sudan is sick, or if there is a
family problem that they have to deal with there. They then
return to Kakuma. Finally, there are many cases of families,
or occasionally unaccompanied children, coming to
Kakuma so that the children could benefit from the educa-
tion in the camp.
Taken as a whole, we think that the findings reported
here merit serious attention and further research, including
in other refugee contexts. At the same time, we are also
cognizant of the constraints and challenges present in use-
fully applying psychological models in the realm of hu-
manitarian assistance. In this regard, Ager and Loughry
have identified two key issues of particular relevance to our
work.26 First, psychology is often perceived as primarily
concerned with the internal states and behaviours of indi-
viduals, rather than with large populations and the environ-
mental factors that impact them (the focus of most
humanitarian relief efforts). Here we believe that our ap-
proach attempts to help bridge these gaps. Indeed, among
the important beliefs that individuals hold are their convic-
tions about those very groups to which they belong. These
group-focused beliefs—in this specific instance, beliefs
about the circumstances facing prospective returnees—can
be quite broad in their influence, and they can affect both
individual and collective responses to external events. Sec-
ond, in its often quixotic search for “universal” principles
of human behaviour, psychological analysis can fail to rec-
ognize the realities of “cultural specificity.” Here we aim to
confront this issue head-on, precisely by exploring whether
beliefs about vulnerability, injustice, distrust, superiority,
and helplessness—with local variations in salience and
modes of expression—have cross-cultural applicability and
relevance for humanitarian workers assisting refugees in
diverse settings.
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